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It is shown that any non-first-order f agment of quantificational dynamic logic 
with certain natural syntactic losure properties has a H2°-hard validity problem. 
(Somewhat weaker assumptions give a "A°-hard '' validity problem.) Examples how 
this best possible with such hypotheses, and the weakest natural syntactic losure 
assumptions, not satisfied by the given examples with H ° validity problem, 
immediately give rise to //'rcompleteness. This confirms the pattern arising from 
complexity determinations by Harel, Meyer, and Pratt ("Proceedings, 9th ACM 
Symposium Theory of Computing," 1977). Also, virtually any non-first-order 
fragment must fail to have uniformly relative recursive numerability of logical con- 
sequence. 
INTRODUCTION 
One factor determining the applicability of a logic of program behavior is 
our ability to characterize and recognize the valid sentences of the logic, i.e., 
the complexity of the validity (decision) problem. For dynamic logic (DL), 
this problem was studied by Hard, Meyer, and Pratt (1977), and Andr6ka, 
N~meti, and Sain (1979), with consistently unfavorable results. Thus Harel 
et aL (1977) found that the sets of valid sentences of DLre (DL, hereafter), 
and of various quite restrictive fragments, were H11-complete. Another 
fragment, of striking interest because it contained translations of all basic 
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partial correctness tatements, was found to have a H°-complete validity 
problem by Harel et al. Curiously, they found no natural fragments with 
validity problem of intermediate complexity. 
All such results about particular fragments have one basic weakness from 
an applied point of view: They do not appear to exclude the possibility that 
all sentences of interest in a particular application might be incorporated in
some well-chosen fragment with more tractable validity problem. The prac- 
titioner can overwhelm the theorist with a potentially unlimited supply of 
fragments for which the complexity of the validity problem needs to be deter- 
mined. We propose to remedy this situation by providing axioms on 
fragments of DL which are sufficient conditions for their validity problem to 
be (A °-, H °-, HI -) hard. Examples show that the conditions are quite tight. 
Thus we provide general criteria for hardness, which cut across cases rather 
differently from generalizations suggested more directly by the work of Harel 
et al. 
An additional advantage of our axiomatic approach is that it makes only 
limited use of special properties of DL; moreover the properties involved can 
be stated quite abstractly. Thus our results appear potentially applicable to 
other logics of program behavior. Our method is to adapt and carefully 
axiomatize a construction in classical model theory originally proposed in 
Lindstr6m (1969). This construction lead to the development in 
mathematical logic of "abstract model theory," an axiomatic approach to 
comparing classical ogics. Such an approach to the study of programming 
logics seems desirable, both because of the inconclusiveness of negative 
results concerning particular fragments and because of the need for 
systematisation f the currently proliferating logics of pl;ograms. 
After obtaining our results, we learned of the related work of Makowsky 
(1980), which overlaps with ours concerning the axiomatization of HI- 
completeness of validity problems. Our notion of fragment is much weaker 
than the notion of logic used by Makowsky, and generally in abstract model 
theory. That discipline is primarily engaged in systematizing the search for 
large fragments of second-order logic which are model-theoretically trac- 
table, and in that context it is felt to be natural to require logics to satisfy the 
syntactic closure properties satisfied by ordinary first-order logic. These 
closure properties lead directly to H~l-complete validity problems (in the 
context of DL). On the other hand, we want to show hardness of validity 
problems for very small and possibly contrived fragments, and therefore have 
avoided unnecessary closure hypotheses on fragments. Thus our results are 
more general than those previously obtained. But more interestingly, our 
work reveals structure not accessible under the customary hypotheses on 
logics. 
It had been understood since Lindstr6m (1969) that the full complement 
of closure properties allows one to define the natural numbers (co, <) with 
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their order by a single sentence of the logic, possibly involving new 
predicates. This gives a//~-hard validity problem. But with fewer hypotheses, 
the class of finite sets becomes definable by a sentence of the logic, and this 
gives//°-hard validity problem (Section 2). (If a slightly different notion of 
definability is used, ,,-0 . . . .  z~2-nara validity problem, see Section 3.) Surprisingly, 
there is no intermediate combination of natural hypotheses which force 
validity problems above H ° without making them//l-hard. Examples how 
that any closure condition short of full first-order closure is consistent with a 
H ° validity problem. Moreover, no definability condition wih strength inter- 
mediate between definability of finiteness and definability of (co, <) appears 
to be known. Correspondingly, no "natural" fragment appears to be known 
with validity problem of intermediate complexity. Thus we have an unex- 
pected but seemingly fundamental break in complexity, from three different 
points of view. In a sense, these results "explain" the pattern found by Harel 
et al., their results can be seen to instantiate the different levels of complexity 
which appear in our theory. 
We can apply the Lindstr6m construction because of the equivalence 
between quantificational DL with Kripke semantics and a fragment of 
infinitary first-order logic with the Tarski semantics of classical model 
theory, demonstrated by Meyer and Parikh (1981). For this allows us to 
view DL as having a Tarski semantics (with the semantics of the logical 
primitives of DL given by the classical semantics for their translations), and 
proceed to do classical model theory. This is extremely fortunate, for analogs 
of the Lindstr6m construction are unknown for genuinely nonclassical logics 
requiring Kripke semantics. It is even unclear what kinds of analogs could 
exist, for various forms of Craig interpolation and sep~aration fail for modal 
logics with Kripke semantics (Fine, 1979) and for intuitionistic predicate 
calculus with Kripke semantics (Gabbay, 1971); and as the proofs below 
make clear, the Lindstr6m construction constitutes essentially an axiomatic 
proof of Craig separation. (See especially Proposition 2.2 and its 
Corollary 2.3.) In effect, what Meyer and Parikh have shown is that quan- 
tificational dynamic logic is not a genuinely nonclassical logic: The Kripke 
semantics is eliminable because we have an explicit determinate analysis of 
the state transitions associated with any of the "modal" program .operators, 
which can be expressed in a sufficiently strong classical language. In 
contrast, propositional DL allows no analysis of state transitions; therefore 
its program operators appear essentially modal and the Kripke semantics 
appear essentially ineliminable. 
For a variety of reasons, expositions in the literature of the Lindstr6m 
construction are neither suitably axiomatized nor conveniently accessible to 
the nonlogician in the form we require. Therefore, we have attempted an 
exposition which is relatively complete in this respect, giving reference to the 
literature in a final section. 
VALIDITY IN DYNAMIC LOGIC 5 1 
1. PRELIMINARIES 
a. Dynamic Logic 
The standard reference is Harel (1979). We use the definitions given in 
Meyer and Parikh (1981), as we presuppose their translation of DLre into 
infinitary first-order logic. The translation together with the classical Tarski 
semantics for first-order logic with infinite conjunctions and disjunctions 
induces a Tarski semantics for DLre: A formula ~0 of DLre holds of a 
structure (state) _M (under an assignment rh of elements of M to the free 
individual parameters of ~0) iff its translation holds in _M in the classical 
sense. We write _M ~ 9. The translation also induces such "syntactic" notions 
as that of free parameters: x occurs free in ~0 if it occurs free in the tran- 
slation of (p. Note that array assignments ranslate into statements involving 
correspondingly chosen function symbols. 
We introduce a restriction to that part of DLre consisting of formulae with 
the occurrence property: After translation the formula contains only finitely 
many free variables and nonlogical primitives (relation, constant, and 
function symbols). The restriction could probably be avoided in some (not 
all) arguments below, in favor of renaming closure (Section 3); but this 
would considerably complicate the arguments. Sentences of practical interest 
about real programs always have the property; experience with infinitary 
logic (as in Barwise, 1975, where the corresponding formulas are the proper 
infinitary formulas) suggests no advantage in dealing theoretically with more 
general classes of formulas. 
A fragment ,7- of DL is any set of formulas of DL. If, say, (0 C ,7 ,  we 
may refer to ~0 in arguments about ~-whether  or not ~o ~J - ,  because 
,TU {~} c DL. Fragments of DL inherit from DL the semantics described 
above, as well as the following properties: 
(1) The occurrence property: the finiteness restrictions just described. 
(2) The L6wenheim property: Any satisfiable formula is satisfiable in 
a structure with countable universe. 
These are the only properties of DL used below beyond those explicitly 
mentioned in hypotheses of assertions. Thus the arguments below can be 
extended to any logic of programs with these properties. 
For any fragment ~¢-, Val(~ ¢-) is the set of G6del numbers of valid 
sentences in J - .  We identify formulas ~o of DL with their G6del numbers F~0] 
which we assume defined in parallel to the inductive definition of the 
formulas themselves; in particular [(@~0] should be given by a fixed 
primitive recursive function of: [~o], an index for a as an r.e. set, and possibly 
other parameters depending on a. A bit of caution is needed here! The set of 
G6del numbers of DL will be properly HI, e.g., not 21 , so one cannot deter 
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mine whether a number is a G6del number. Basic syntactic relations uch as 
{(I~01, [~01): q~ C DL} will still be recursive; the culprit is the program quan- 
tifier: we cannot decide syntactic properties of the terms of an r.e. sequence 
from an index for the sequence, e.g., whether it is a sequence of sequences of 
instructions (seqs). 
b. Back-and-Forth 
A general reference is Monk (1976), esp. Chap. 26, or Flum (1975). A 
language L is a set of relation, constant, and operation symbols. An L- 
structure is a Tarski structure interpreting the symbols in L appropriately. A 
structure on domain (universe) A will be denoted by _A; the context 
determines which symbols _A interprets. The interpretation i  _A of a symbol 
R is written R d. Let _A, _B both interpret (at least) L. A partial isomorphism p 
is a 1-1 map to _B with domain dom(p) ~_ A which preserves the structure in 
L, e.g., 
c A E dom p ~ p(c A-) = c ~-, for each constant c; 
(a, b} ~ R A- ¢~ (p(a), p(b)} C R -~ 
each binary relation R,and a, b C dora(p); 
fA_ (d) = b ¢> f-B(p(6)) = p(b) each function symbol f, and cL b from dora(p). 
of nonempty 
property 
Let a = (a, ~<) be a total order. The main case to consider is 
n = ({0, 1 ..... n}, ~<) the order ~< of ~o = {0, 1, 2,..}. 
An g-system of partial isomorphisms from _A to _B is a collection 
{Sx:X~a} 
sets Sx of partial isomorphisms with the back-and-forth 
Vx, y~a with x>y;  
Vp~S x, VaEA,  3qESy ,  q_~p&aEdom(q) ;  
VpCS x, VbEB,  Sq~Sy,  q @ p&bErange(q) .  
1.1. THEOREM (Cantor-Russel). Let _A, _B be countable, a a total order 
with an infinite descending chain. I f  there is an _a-system of partial 
isomorphisms from _A to _B, there is an isomorphism f :  A ~- B (all for the 
same language L ). 
The set of formulas of first-order logic in language L is L o~,o. A quan- 
VALIDITY IN DYNAMIC LOGIC 53 
tifierfree formula is one in which no quantifiers occur. The rank of a formula 
of Lotto is defined by: 
rk(Rt 1 ... t.) = number of function symbols in Rtl ... t.. 
rk(t I = t2) = (number of function symbols in tl = t2) - 1. 
rk(~q)) = rk(~o), rk(q) V ~,) = max{rk(o), rk(qJ)t. 
rk(3x~0) = rk(q)) + 1. 
An n-sentence of L~o~o is one of rank ~< n. If_A and B agree on all n-sentences, 
we write _A-~_B. We need the fundamental theorem of Ehrenfeucht and 
FraYss& 
1.2. THEOREM. There is an n-system from _A to _11 iff _A -,_B. 
2. H~-HARD VALIDITY PROBLEMS 
We axiomatize here what appears to be the most significant class of 
nontrivial proper fragments of DL. These fragments typically contain trans- 
lations of partial correctness assertions P{a} Q 
I 
P- ,  [a] Q, P, Q first-order, a program-free program. 
Here a program a is program-flee if it contains no test formulas which 
involve program quantifiers. Indeed, Harel et al. define a fragment with H~- 
complete validity problem which contains all such partial correctness 
assertions; it is equivalent to example ~7 0 below. 
After specifying the notions involved, we show: 
(a) Val(,7) is H°-hard for any fragment Y-  effectively extending first 
order logic and closed under disjunction, which contains a sentence the 
negation of which defines the class of finite sets. 
(b) The latter condition always obtains if J -  also is closed under 
negation and relativisation, and contains a non-first-order sentence. 
A set of examples how that no stronger esults can be obtained from these 
or even certain stronger hypotheses. In the following section, we show how 
to obtain somewhat weaker conclusions from somewhat weaker hypotheses. 
We now give the necessary definitions. I f~  is a fragment of DL, then j~-c 
denotes the fragment consisting of all negations of formulas in 3 - ;  these need 
not themselves belong to ~.  ,~  (effectively) contains Lo~oo (i.e., first-order 
logic) if there is a (recursive) function #:L~,o , -~J - tak ing all first-order 
formulas under a standard G6del numbering to logically equivalent formulas 
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in ~-. ~ is (effectively) closed under disjunction if there is a (reeursive) 
function c~:~- ×~-~' -  such that for each pair of formulas (~o 1, ~0z) from 
J - ,  6(~0~, 2) is logically equivalent to (~01 V 92). Similarly, one can define 
closure under conjunction, negation, existential quantification, and other 
syntactic onstructions. 
The first sense in which the class of finite sets may be definable in a 
fragment ~"  is: 
There is an ~-sentence ~u containing a unary relation symbol P such that: 
If _M is a structure interpreting all primitives in ~, and M ~ ~,, 
then the set p M= {m C M: _M~Pm} is finite. (*~) 
For each arbitrarily large finite n, there exist infinite structures _M 
as above, with IP_ M] = n. (*u) 
If this holds we say that finiteness is (*)-definable in ~Y-. 
Suppose an J--sentence qt as in ( , )  is given. Then the DL-sentence ~,1: 
qtl= qJ A Vx[Qx~Px] ,  Q a new unary predicate symbol, will satisfy ( , )  
with the apprently stronger clause (w.r.t. Q instead of P) 
For each finite n, there is an infinite _M as in (*0 with JQ-~[ = n. (*i~i) 
Thus if J -  is sufficiently closed to contain a logical equivalent of ~,~, as in 
the application below, we may assume (*m) also holds for ~,. 
2.1. PROPOSITION. Let ~Y- be a fragment of DL effectively containing 
Lo, o, and effectively closed under disjunction. I f  finiteness is (,)-definable in 
F °, Val(J-) is a ll°-hard set. 
Proof. Assume qJ C ~ such that ~ qt is a definition of finiteness in ~°  
satisfying (,). Let ~0 ~ L~o~o be the conjunction of 
Vx [x <~ c ~ Px] 
and the axioms JU for (co, 0, <, s, +, .) (Schoenfeld, 1967, p. 22), where all 
symbols except P are chosen distinct from any symbols occurring in ~,. Then 
the map A given by 
A [Vx ~2 ~(x, 2)1 = ~ [~', g [~0 V 3 2 ~(e, y)] 1, 
r/ quantiferfree arithmetic formula, is an effective many-one transformation 
which takes Vx 3 f  r/(x, y) to a sentence in J -  logically equivalent to 
(~0 A ~ ~,)-~ ~y r/(e, y). 
We claim that Vx S)Tr/ is true in arithmetic iffA[Vx 3fr/] is valid. 
Suppose A[Vx3fr l ]  is valid. For arbitrary fixed n C co, consider any 
infinite structure _M interpreting P and all other primitives in ~', such that 
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M ~ qJ and p M contains at least n + 1 elements. By the L6wenheim property 
of DL we may assume M is countable. Interpret ~< on M as the order of 
(co, ~<) taking P-~ to be an initial segment; define s, +, .  accordingly and 
interpret c as the (n + 1)th element of p_M under K. Thus we obtain a 
structure _M ~ interpreting all primitives in A [Vx 3y r/I, and _M ~ ~ q) A ~, .  So 
by validity of A[Yx  3fir/], M I~ ~ v~(12', .~). But interpreting c as n, this is a 
sentence of arithmetic, and by construction of _M ~ we have 
(co, ~, s, + , . )  ~ ~y ~(n, y). 
As n was arbitrary, Vx 3y I'/ is true in arithmetic. 
Conversely, suppose A[Vx3f i t l ]  is invalid. Then there is a structure _M, 
_M~oA~qzA- ,~y~/(c ,y) .  From the definition of O, _Mr is a (possibly 
nonstandard) model of the fragment ~4 r of arithmetic, with _M ~ ~3y rl(n, y) 
for some standard n E co, n = c M-. The standard model of arithmetic is a 
substructure of _M, so if there are no )7 in _M such that rl(n, 37), there certainly 
is no such standard y, and 
(co, G s, +, .) ~ -~y  ~(n, y), 
(co, ~, s, +, .) ~ -Vx 3y ~(x, y). 
Thus A gives a many-one reduction to Val(_f) of the set of true //~ 
sentences of arithmetic, which is H°-complete. Therefore, Val(~-) is /-/o 
hard. II 
It makes no difference to the proof of this proposition if we replace the 
unary predicate symbol P in (*) by a unary formula of first-order logic. 
Harel et al. outline a proof of the proposition for a particular fragment, ,7  0 
below, with an in essence explicitly given (,)-definition of finiteness in ~-~. 
The proof they sketch is a rather elaborate coding of Turing machine 
operation (instead of arithmetic) in a relational structure, giving a reduction 
to the totality problem for Turing machines. A similar coding appears in 
Hanf (1965), where the Turing machines coded verify that given axiomatised 
theories are complete, a H~-complete special case of the totality problem. 
The fragment studied by Harel et al. is special in that it allows a 
convenient straightforward (.)-definition of finiteness. Indeed, many 
fragments of interest will contain some such formula such as Vxy (Px A Py - ,  
(z :=x;  while z¢y  do z :=f (z ) )  true). But as it is impossible to tell in 
advance whether this will occur in a given small fragment of DL, we replace 
the ad hoc construction by one based on closure axioms on the fragment. We 
need another such axiom. 
Let _M be a structure, P a unary predicate interpreted in _M by P~ % M. If 
p M is closed under all operations which interpret function symbols in _M, 
then Pg determines a substructure _M (m of 34 which interprets all primitives 
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interpreted in _M except P: just restrict he interpretations to the set P~. Now 
a fragment J is closed under relativisation if for any formula ~,0 ?) in J - ,  ~Y- 
contains a formula q/(P)()?) which expresses, for any ~ from p M, that ~u holds 
of Y on _M(m; more precisely: 
for each formula ~, in J - ,  and any unary predicate symbol P not 
occurring in ~,, there is another formula q/P) in J -  such that: for 
any structure _M interpreting P and all primitives in q/(such that p M 
is closed under interpretations of function symbols if any), and for 
any assignment of elements of P~ (and so, of M (p)) to the "free" 
variables in ~t, 
_M ~ ~(P) ~ _M (p) ~ ~. 
Up to logical equivalence, there is a canonical construction of ~(P) from 
~. We give it in order to clarify the strength and plausibility of the 
assumption of relativisation closure. Reference is to the formation rules of 
DLre as given in Meyer and Parikh (1981). 
The map ()(e) takes formulas to formulas, seqs to seqs, and programs to 
programs, but instructions to seqs. 
(D) (a) I fA is an atomic formula, A (p) =A. 
(b) If A, B are formulas, x a variable, and a is a program, then 
~A (v) ----- ~(A(m), (A V B) (m =A (m V B (m, 
((a) A )(P) = (a (m) A (P), 
(3 ×A) (p) = 3x[Px A A(P)], 
(C) If a is a program, a = (ai)iz~o, a i seqs 
a(P) (-(P)'~ 
= \tzi  ) i~w 
which will be seen to be r.e. (in a). 
(B) If Qll,-.., r/,) is a seq, r/1 ..... r/, instructions, then (q~ ..... q,)(P) is 
the concatenation of the seqs r/] p) ..... . o') qn • 
(A) (a), (b) If r/ is an ordinary assignment or an array assignment, 
r/(m = r/. 
(c) (y= ?)(P)= (y= ?;Py?). 
(d) I fA is a formula, (A?) (m =A(V)? 
We omit the inductive proof that this construction works. It is important to 
note that this transformation i serts only atomic tests, transforms first-order 
formulas to first-order formulas, and is a regular (real-time or finite state 
machine) transformation on programs with first-order or simple tests. Thus it 
preserves most syntactic subclasses of DL considered in the literature. 
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Our axiomatisation of (,)-definability of finiteness is given by the 
following proposition and its consequences. 
2.2. PROPOSITION. Let .7  be a fragment of DL containing Loo~o and 
closed under conjunction and relativisation. I f  finiteness is not (.)-definable 
in ~Y~, then any two disjoint .7-classes are separated by an Lo~o-elass in their 
common language. (That is, if (9~, (9z are ~.~-sentenees such that Mod((fi~) 
Mod(92) = ~l, then for some first-order sentence X involving only nonlogical 
primitives oceurring both in (91 and (92, Mod((h)c Mode) and Mod((92)~_ 
Mod(~z). Here inclusions and intersections are with respect o structures 
obtained by disregarding interpretations of any primitives not common to (91 
and ~2") 
Proof. The conclusion could only fail if for each n > 0 there are 
structures _A n ~ (9~, _B n ~ (92 with _A n =,_B, w.r.t, formulas in the common 
language. For as there are only finitely many n-sentences in this language for 
any given n, we could otherwise set 
t '=  V A {0:n-sentence,_A~0,_B~0/.  
_A~ol _B~o2 
But then let P, Q1, Q2 (unary); <, >, G, G 1 (binary); H, H ~ (ternary) be 
new predicate symbols and consider the ~7-sentence qJ obtained by con- 
joining 
(a) (~0~ QI) A (9~o~, 
with first-order sentences expressing 
(b) < is a total order on P. 
(c) G, H specify a system of maps QI -~ Q2 by 
(i) the map p~ is {(x, y): xC  Q~ A yC  Q2 A Huxy holds}, 
(ii) for xCP,  S~= {p,: Gxu holds}. 
(d)R These maps are partial isomorphisms: 
(HUXlY 1 A ... A Huxny , )~ (Rx~ ... xne-~ Ry I ." yn), 
for each relation symbol R occurring in both (91 and (92; and similarly for 
function symbols and constants. 
(e ) ( S x: x C P) has the back-and-forth property 
1Vzj C Qj, ~z 2 ~ Q2, ?pv c I x,: pv = pu L.) {(z~, z2) } 
x' <xAp~CS~- ,  Vzz~Q2,3z~CQ~,~pvCIx ,  p~=p,  L2{(z~,zz)}. 
(For details, see Flum, 1975, p. 265.) 
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(c')-(e') The same for G 1, H l, but with respect o the dual order > 
on P. 
From A, ,  _B, as above, we obtain a model _M of ~v with ]P~I = n + 1 by 
taking the universe of _M as the disjoint union of ( i)the universe of A,,  
(ii) the universe of B , ,  (iii) a countable set N; and interpreting Ql as the 
universe of_A,, Q2 as the universe of_B,, P as some (n + 1)-element subset of 
N, < as a total order on P, and G and H as the n-system of partial 
isomorphisms which must existby Theorem 1.2 if_A,-,_B,. 
On the other hand, there cannot be a model _M of q/with p M infinite. For 
otherwise we could express this in a first-order sentence with a new binary 
relation symbol R (say < has the chain) as 
3xyRxy A Vxy[Rxy~ (Px A Py A x < y)] 
A Vxy[Rxy -4 ~z Rzx]. 
Conjoining this with gt to obtain q/1, still in 3-,  and interpreting R suitably 
in _M, there must be a countable model _N of q/1 because. DL has the 
L6wenheim property. But then _N still contains the infinite descending chain, 
and hence by Theorem 1.1 _N (°') and _N (°2) are isomorphic in their common 
language, which by (a) contradicts the assumed isjointness of Mod(~01) and 
Mod(~02). Thus q/would give a definition of finiteness in J satisfying (.). 
2.3. COROLLARY. Let J -  be a fragment of DL effectively containing 
L~,o,, effectively elosed under disjunction, and closed under relativisation. I f  
two disjoint J-classes fail to be separated by any L~o~o-class in "their common 
language, then Val(J-) is ll°2-hard. 
Proof The proof is immediate from Propositions 2.1 (for ,7 )  and 2.2 
(applied to ~,-c!). 
For J-=L~o~o, Val%~-) is r.e. and Corollary 2.3 is Craig separation 
(equivalent to Craig interpolation). The Lindstr6m construction is thus an 
axiomatic proof of this result. 
In a special case, the inseparability hypothesis may be replaced by 
something rather more striking: suppose (Pl = ~0, (P2 = ~g0 both in j - c ,  and 0 
inequivalent to any first-order sentence. In particular, this gives 
2.4. THEOREM. Let Y -  be a fragment of DL effectively containing L,oo,, 
effectively closed under disjunction, and closed under negation and 
relativization. I f  ~-properly extends Lo,,o (contains a sentence not logically 
equivalent o any JTrst-order sentence), then Val(J-) is H°2-hard. 
We now give examples which show that H°-hardness is the strongest 
possible conclusion from our hypotheses. 
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~f0 = {[a] ~o: a r.e. program-free program, ~0 first-order formula}, 
= {Z: Z a finite Boolean combination of~0-formulas }, 
= {[a]z: a r.e. program-free program, 2'~-formula}. 
These fragments have the following properties: 
(i) They effectively include L~o~o. 
(ii) They are effectively closed under conjunction, disjunction, 
relativization and parametrization (see Section 4). 
(iii) ~ is effectively closed under negation. 
(iv) ~ and ~ are effectively closed under universal program-free r.e. 
program quantification (and hence universal first-order quantification). 
(v) Val(~o) is H°-hard (by Harel et aI., or the above). Hence the 
same is true for ~ ,  ~'22. 
(vi) Harel et al. show that Val(~oo) is H °. Their argument extends to 
,Tll and ~:  After bringing negations inside the program quantifiers, and 
perhaps renaming of variables to avoid introduction of unintended 
connections between programs and formulas, we obtain a prenex form 
[al] ..-[an] (fll)..'(flm)q): ~pEL~o~o, ai,fli r.e. program-free programs, 
logically equivalent to the original sentence. 
This is valid iff the resulting r.e. collection of instances of 
are all valid. As these are in turn r.e. disjunctions of first-order sentences, the 
compactness and completeness theorems of first-order logic imply that the 
set of valid such instances is r.e., giving the result for ~ .  It is clear from the 
prenex form that the same argument will work for ~ .  
As Harel et al. note, the special interest of ~ is that it contains logical 
equivalents of all partial correctness assertions 
91 --~ [a] 02;  ~01' q~2 first-order, a program-free. 
The equivalence may be given either as they suggest, as 
[9,? o a] 02, 
or if we wish to avoid introducing (first-order) tests, by the renaming 
strategy alluded to in (vi): for new variables £' corresponding to the free 
variables of q~l, 
Ix '  :=  x o a (£ ' /x ) ]  9 ,  -+ 
where A(a/fl) is the result of substituting a for fl in A. 
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3. A° -HARD VALIDITY PROBLEMS 
We saw that in the context of dynamic logic, the hypothesis of 
relativization closure is somewhat elaborate, and perhaps somewhat 
unnatural. We now show how, by slightly more complicated analysis, a 
simpler closure hypothesis may be used. This was Lindstr6m's original 
hypothesis. 
In an arbitrary formula of DL,  we have occurrences of uninterpreted 
relation symbols (e.g., in atomic tests) and possibly constants and function 
symbols (as array assignments). We call a fragment J -  of DL closed under 
renaming iff for some systematic hoice of distinct new relation, constant, 
and function symbols (array names) there is a function / / :~-~J -wh ich  
assigns to each formula 0) of .Y- (a formula logically equivalent o) the 
formula obtained from (0 by replacing the old symbols by the new ones. At 
first sight this seems totally innocuous, for if the symbols are uninterpreted, 
we surely should not care just what notation we choose for them, except 
perhaps that the collection of all symbols used might be required to be, say, 
primitive recursive. 
Moreover, renaming in no way affects the complexity of formulas, tests, or 
programs. But combined with closure under conjunction, the condition is in 
fact quite powerful. Suppose we have two structures and sentences 
M1 ~ (,o 1 , ~m2 ~ 0) 2 , 
and ml, m z have the same cardinality. Then we can "code" _M 1 onto the 
universe of _M 2 via a bijection, using new names for the images of the 
relations, constants, functions of _M 1. Then i f / / i s  a renaming function which 
replaces the old names by the new ones, and if we denote the image structure 
by H*(_M~, _Mz) , we have for each formula 
_M1 ~ 0) ~, n*(_M1, _M2) ~ n(O), 
and in particular, H*(_M 1, _M2)~H(0)~)/x q)2. So in this way we can code 
two given structures onto one universe and still refer to what is true in the 
structures individually; this was exactly what we achieved by relativization 
in the preceding arguments. It is perhaps worth noting that this same result 
may be obtained for the logic obtained from DL (modifying the semantics) 
by assigning afixed interpretation to certain relation, constant, or function 
symbols. Then one requires H to leave those particular symbols unchanged, 
and construct H* using a bijection which is an isomorphism between the 
(fixed) interpretations of the special symbols in _M~ and _M 2. We shall not 
explicitly include this situation in the following; the reader can verify that the 
arguments do go through. 
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3.1. PROPOSITION. Let ,~-  be a fragment of DL containing L,o,o and 
closed under conjunction and renaming. I f  finiteness is not (.)-definable in 
27, then any two .Y-classes disjoint on infinite structures are separated on 
infinite structures by an Lo~,o-class (i.e., disregarding any finite members of 
the classes. Recall that our structures are "states," not Kripke structure 
universes). 
Proof. As above, the conclusion could only fail if for each n there are 
infinite structures _A.,B. with A~,=._B., _A~q~l, Bn~(~2. By the 
LSwenheim property of DL, we may assume _A.,_B. have cardinality 
exactly N0- 
Now form ~, as in the proof of Proposition 2.2, but with renaming 
function H as 
(a 1) g((9,) A (02, 
(d)R . . . - - ,  (Rx, . . .  x.<=> l l(R) y, . . .  y.). 
The arguments proceed entirely as in that proof, except that we obtain a 
model of ~, by taking H*(_A_ ~,_B.) and adding suitable interpretations of the 
additional symbols P, <, G, H, >, G 1, H 1. Because the universe of_B. and so 
of//*(_A_.,_B.) is countable, there is always room for these interpretations. 
It follows that existence of disjoint L~-inseparable .P<classes leads to a 
non-r.e, validity problem, but with a complication due to the restriction to 
infinite structures. We develop this directly for the special case of main 
interest. 
3.2. THEOREM. Let J -  be a fragment of DL effectively containing Lo~ ~, 
effectively closed under disjunction, and closed under negation and renaming. 
I f  ~-properly extends L,oo~ on infinite structures, then Val( J -)  is lI°-hard. I f  
J properly extends Lo~o~, but not on infinite structures, finiteness is (**)- 
definable in J -  (see below) and Val( J -)  is A~-hard (see later). 
Proof (and definition). The initial statement follows from Propositions 
2.1 and 3.1 as before. We say that finiteness is (**)-definable in ~ if there 
is an .7-sentence with arbitrarily large finite models but no infinite model. 
Suppose that .7  properly extends L,o,o, but not in regards infinite structures. 
Thus we have an J--sentence ~p and first-order sentence X such that: 
For any infinite structure _M, _M ~ q~ <> M ~ Z; but ~0 is not equivalent to 
any first-order sentence. We claim that 
ty=(@A~2")V (~@Az) 
is an .Y--sentence with arbitrarily large finite but no infinite models. It is 
clear there are no infinite and some finite models. If there were only finite 
models with at most N elements, then by the occurrence property of DL 
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there are only finitely many relevant nonlogical primitives, and only finitely 
many isomorphism classes of models _M of ~u, each of which is completely 
described by a first-order sentence 0M. But then (o would be logically 
equivalent to the first-order sentence 
(Z V V{OM : _M~0 A ~Z}) A ~V{OM : _M ~ Z A ~,,(o}. 
From this (**)-definition of finiteness by q/, which we can view as an ~c  
sentence, the complexity result will follow by Proposition 3.3 below. II 
Let K_c co be the set associated with the Halting problem. We call a set 
A _c co A0_hard if both K and/ (  (the complement of K in co) are many-one 
reducible to A. Such a set cannot be r.e. or co-r.e. The prototypical example 
is the join of K and/~. To dispel the impression that the definition of A ~-hard 
is ad hoc, we discuss some consequences. 
i(a) A set B is positive bounded truth table reducible to A (with norm 
N) iff there is a recursive function f which on input x C co outputs a positive 
Boolean combination of (no more than N) formulae of the form "n i E A," 
such that: VxCco[xEB<=>f(x) holds of A]. Now every Boolean 
combination o f /7  o sets is positive bounded truthtable reducible to any A °- 
hard set A ("A is pbtt-hard for BA(H~)"). For bringing any negations inside, 
it becomes a positive Boolean combination of H ° and S ° sets, each many- 
one reducible to / (  or K, respectively, and hence to A. No r.e. or co-r.e, set is 
pbtt-hard for BA(H°), for any set pbtt-reducible to a r.e. (co-r.e.) set is itself 
r.e. (co-r.e.). 
(b) A set B is positive Turing reducible to A if B can be defined in 
arithmetic by two formulas 
y E B ¢> 3xRl (x  ) ~:> VxRz(x), 
where R1, R 2 are recursive predicates in which A occurs positively (i.e., as a 
unary predicate not in the scope of any negations or antecedents of 
conditionals). In machine terms, the oracle for A diverges (fails to return 
control) on queries with negative answer; queries to the oracle are run in 
parallel by the main processor. Now every A°-set (given by a pair of 2;°2 - 
formulas, defining the set and its complement) is positive Turing reducible to 
any A°-hard set A ("A is pT-hard for A°) ''. For le t f  and g, respectively, be 
the many-one reduction of H ° sets to A v ia / (  and of S ° sets to A via K. 
Then we have for B given by (3xO 1 , 3x02), 01 , 02 H°-formulae, 
y C B ¢~ 3x:f(Ol(X , y), x) C A, 
Vx: g(~O2(x, y), x) ~ A. 
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But again, no r.e. or co-r.e, set is pT-hard for A~, for any set pT-reducible to 
an r.e. (co-r.e.) set is r.e. (co-r.e.). 
3.3. PROPOSITION. Let J -  be a fragment of DL effectively containing 
L o~o~ and effectively closed under disjunction. I f  finiteness is (**)-definable in 
,yc,  then Val(J-) is a A~-hard set. 
Proof As K is many-one reducible to Val(L~,~o ) by representability of
recursive functions in R. Robinsons finitely axiomatizable 2 ,  K is many-one 
reducible to Va l ( J )  by the effective containment. So it remains to give the 
many-one reduction of /~ to Val(J~-). Let ~u be the (**)-definition of 
finiteness in ~7 c, and let ~0 ~ Lo~o~ be the conjunction of the axioms .¢'~ 
obtained by modifying the axioms ~4/~ to axiomatize an arbitrary initial 
segment [o, e] of (co, 0, s, <, +, .): replace s, +, • by relation symbols, add 
extra axioms asserting single-valuedness, e.g. (for clarity, we continue to 
write function symbols, but only in relational contexts: f (2)  = y), 
Vxyz [sxy A sxz --, y = z] 
and a more careful formulation of the recursion conditions for +, . ,  
Vx, [x < c --, 3y sxy] A Vx[x 4 c], 
Vxy, y', z, z', [(x + y = z A syy' A szz') ~ x + y' = z' ]', 
Vxy, y ' , z , z ' ,  [ (xy=zAsyy 'Ax+z=z 'Az '4c ) - - ,xy '•z , ] ,  
where all symbols are chosen distinct from those in ~,. Then for any H~- 
sentence V:?0 of arithmetic in these same symbols, set 
A(W0) = 6[~,, ~(~~ V VX0)]. 
Then we have, as in the proof of Proposition 2.1, 
{co, O, <, s, +, .) ~ VYO ~ A(VXO) e Val(.~-). 
It remains to provide an effective many-one reduction of the (known H~- 
complete) H°-theory of arithmetic in the ordinary arithmetic language with 
function symbols s, +, . ,  to the H°l-theory in our relational anguage which 
was reduced to Val(J-) above. This is accomplished by the familiar device 
of eliminating "nesting"--any occurrence of function symbols except in 
subformulas of the form u = f(~), , g variables. 
The algorithm: On input 0(Y) quantiferfree 
while 0 contains nesting (say of f (g))  
do 0(2, z):= [z = fQ7)-~ O(z/f(g))], z next new variable; 
while 0 contains subformulae u = f(g) (or f(zT) = u) 
do O(Y) := O(Rjug/u = f(g)) (or ...); 
643/54/1 2/5 
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Let 0'(2,~,) be the formula output on input ~9(2). Then it is clear, now 
explicitly writing relation symbols Rs, etc., that 
(w, <, s, +, .)~Y20(2)~(w, < Rs,R+,R.)~V2VSO'(2,5 ) 
giving the desired many-one reduction. This completes the proof of 
Theorem 3.2. | 
The following examples show that the proposition gives the strongest 
possible conclusion from the assumptions. 
~s - -  {~oV V]: (0 E L~,~} ULo~o, 
where ~J is the translation into DL (following Meyer and Parikh, 1981) of 
A 3x,...x~ A x,-~xi. 
n~to l<~i<j<~n 
Then for any sentence Z E ~,  ,Z is valid iff 
(a) ~ does not occur in Z, and Z is a valid first-order sentence, or 
(b) ~, occurs in Z, say Z = ~0 V ~,, and ~ is valid in finite structures. 
This is a Boolean combination of H ° conditions (and in fact, many-one 
equivalent o K join /~). But ~3 clearly satisfies the hypotheses of the 
proposition. Somewhat more generally, let 
= Boolean combinations of L,o,o U {~'}, ~' as in ~3.  
Then any sentence • C ~ is logically equivalent to one of the form 
(~, V ~r) A (~02 V ~r) ,  fffl, (/)2 ~ Lww, 
and hence valid iff 
~ ' -~ ~01 , ~ '~a 2 
are both valid. Letting ~,1 C L~ be Vx 3y[y > x] A "> total order," for a 
new relation symbol "<"  not occurring in ~a 2 or ~a I , validity of ;( is again 
seen to be reducible to a Boolean combination of validity on finite structures 
(~al) and first-order validity (¢~--,02). But ~ satisfies the hypotheses of 
Theorem 3.2 (second case); in particular, ~ is closed under 
(i) Boolean combinations, 
(ii) first-order quantification, 
(iii) renaming, and parametrization (see Section 4), 
and properly extends L,~,o, all effectively. 
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4. /-/l-HARD VALIDITY PROBLEMS 
Given a (,)-definition of finiteness, (co, ~<) is definable as the total order 
such that every initial segment is finite. Adding the axioms ~4 ~ then defines 
(co, ~<, s, +, .) up to isomorphism. Then if q/in J~-c defines (co, ~, s, +, .), we 
reduce the set of true Hll-sentences of arithmetic effectively to Val(J-): 
Writing a given sentence in normal form Vf32~( f2)  (Schoenfeld, 1967, 
p. 175), f unary function symbol, r/ recursive predicate, reduce to an J~--- 
sentence logically equivalent o ~,-~ 3Yr/(~Y), using the hypotheses of 
Proposition 2.1., which is valid iff Vf3~? r/is true in arithmetic (co, ~<, s, +, • ). 
Examples ~0-~2 suggest hat we need closure under existential quan- 
tification in ~¢- (universal quantification i J -~) to express in j - c  that every 
initial segment is finite; nor is this enough. Restricting any of ~0-~4 to 
sentences, one obtains fragments vacuously closed under first-order quan- 
tification. So we also require J to be closed under parametrisation: For any 
formula 0 of DL, and new variable x, the parametrisation 0 (xJ is the formula 
obtained by modifying the inductive construction of 0: 
(i) Replace each constant c, or n-ary function or array name f, by a 
unary function e', or (n + l)-ary name f ' ,  with x substituted in the newly 
added positions; 
(ii) similarly for each n-ary relation symbol. 
Note that this operation preserves the syntactic structure of formulas 
completely, and does not increase complexity with respect o the syntactic 
subclasses of DL studied in the literature. 
4.1. THEOREM, Let ~f  satisfy any of the hypotheses in Sections 2 and 3 
giving a (.)-definition of finiteness in ~7 C, and in addition be closed under 
first-order existential quantification and parametrisation. Then the resulting 
conclusion holds with the complexity condition replaced by 
Val(Y-) is nl-complete. 
Proof. As it is known that Val(DL)C HI,  we need only to show H i- 
hardness, i.e., give an effective many-one reduction of the (Hll-complete) set 
of true H] sentences of arithmetic to Val(J-). As pointed out at the 
beginning of this section, it is sufficient to show definability of (co, ~) in .p~-o. 
If ~, C ~7 ° is a (,)-definition of finiteness w.r.t. P, then 
"~< is a total order without last element" A Vx[gt (x) A Vy ~ x P'xy] 
works. | 
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If J -  agrees with first-order logic on infinite structures, so does j -o  and 
we have no hope of defining (co, ~<). Indeed, the conclusion fails as Val(J-) 
is AI~ in this case: Let Val (~-)= Valrln(~- ) n Valinr(3-), validity w.r.t, finite 
and infinite structures. Then for any ~0 C DL 
[q)] ~ Valfin(~ -) <=> 3n ~ co: n codes a finite _M s.t. _M = ~0; 
[~0] C Vali,r(J" ) 
<:> 3Z C L~o,o : rInf-* (~0 ~ Z)] C Val(DL) A r Inf~ Z] ~ Val(L,o,o) 
¢:> ~Z C L,oo, : [Inf-~ (0 ~ ig)] E Val(DL) A [Inf-~ xX ~ Val(L,o,o), 
where Inf is a first-order sentence xpressing in new primitives that the 
universe is infinite. As the satisfaction relation on finite structures is 
inductive and co-inductive on co, hence A ll, and Val(DL) is Ul~, both sets are 
A~. No lower bounds beyond A°-hardness on the complexity of Val(~-) may 
be obtained in this case: Example ~4 satisfies (the effective versions of) all 
syntactic losure conditions we have considered, except for relativization. 
5. THE COMPLEXITY OF LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE 
For first-order logic, we have not only that Validity is r.e., but also 
uniform effective enumerability of logical consequence: There is an oracle 
machine M ~) such that for any A ~_L,ooo, M ~A) enumerates 
{~ CL,o,o:A ~q~ (i.e., VM: M~A ~M~ (p)}. 
This fails almost immediately for non-first-order f agments: 
5.1. THEOREM. Let d~-~ DL contain Lo~,o effectively and be closed 
under renaming. Then 
(a) 3MVA ~r 'M~a)  enumerates {(o C J - :  A ~o},  
iff 
(b) J -=  L,oo,, up to effective logical equivalence given by 
tl: J -~  L o,,o. 
Proof. Given (b), M as in (a) is readily constructed. Conversely, if (a) 
holds and J -=L~,  o, t/ is: given gtC J - ,  enumerate both {0f,/l(Z)): 
zEL,o,o } and {~0 E.N-: 0~ ty~q~} and output the first xCLo ,  o~ such that 
Iz(Z) and (Z,/t(Z)) both appear. BUt if J-:/=L,oo,, we get a contradiction 
to (a) by a variant of the argument of Theorem 3.2: Let ~0 ~J -  not be 
equivalent to any first-order sentence, and consider two cases: 
VALIDITY IN DYNAMIC LOGIC  67 
Case 1. (9 is not equivalent to any first-order sentence on infinite 
structures. 
Let 0 be a body of first-order statements (as in the proof of Theorem 3.2) 
expressing the existence of a back-and-forth system with respect o the order 
relation <. Let a0, a 1 ..... be new constant symbols. Then 
lai  > ai+ 1 : i C 
For otherwise, let M be a model 
{ai < ai+ ~, iC  co; 0,(9, ~H((9)}. All 
pretation of "<"  by restricting it to 
co/~ {0, (9) ~ n((9). 
(interpreting all primitives involved) of 
this is unaffected if we change the inter- 
{a}1}i~,. Then 
_34' ~ {Vx 3y y < x, 0, (9, ~H((9)}. 
By the L6wenheim property of DL, 
necessarily interpreting {ai : i  C co}). 
obtaining _N' countable with 
there is a countable model _N of this (not 
But then we can re-interpret the a i on _N, 
_N' ~ {ai > ai+ ~ : i E co} U 10, (9, ~H((9)t.  
(DL has a much stronger L6wenheim property from which this could be 
inferred immediately, but we are proceding axiomatically.) But this is 
impossible, for the structures _A, H(f i)  coded on _N' must now be isomorphic, 
by Theorem 1.1. 
But if (a) above holds, the machine M(ta  o > a~ ..... 0,(9}) consults its 
oracle at most finitely often before outputting H((9), so in fact there is a finite 
N with 
{a o > a~ > a 2 ... > ax, ~0, (9} ~H((9) .  
This means that for infinite _A, _B, _A =-NB_B &.A ~ (9 =>-_B ~ (9; because =--~. is 
symmetrical we have even 
A - -NB~ [_A ~ (9 ¢>B ~ (91 
so that ca is logically equivalent on infinite structures to the (finite!) Boolean 
combination 
V /~ {x: N-sentence, _A ~ t'} _4 infinite 
contradicting the assumption of Case 1. 
Case 2. (9 is equivalent to 1' on infinite structures. Then there are 
arbitrarily large finite models, but no infinite models, of at least one of 
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~0 A ~2', ~q~ A Z; say the first. Let {a,., i E co} be new constant symbols. Then 
{ai4:aj: i 4= j} U {~o} ~ 2" 
so if (a) holds, then as before there is N C co with 
{ai @ ag: i < j <~ N} U {q~} ~ Z, 
i.e., q~ A ~Z has no models with more than N elements, contradicting what 
we just assumed. For the second possibility, reverse the positions of ~o, 2'. II 
The hypotheses of Theorem 5.1 are much weaker than those given in the 
literature for this result. ("Lo~o~ is maximal among the logics with L6wenheim 
property and compactness.") It is not usually given an effective formulation. 
6. HISTORICAL NOTE 
Lindstr6m (1969) used a hypothesis of closure under renaming rather than 
under relativization. A very complete exposition may be found in Monk 
(1976). In the early 1970s it was discovered how to avoid the special 
treatment of finite structures by using relativization closure as in Section 2. 
The standard exposition along these lines is Flum (1975), on which we have 
often drawn. Flum deals only with the compactness version of the argument 
(cf. Section 5), without attention to questions of effectiveness. Makowsky 
(1980), which Meyer pointed out to us after we had obtained the present 
results, shows how Hll-completeness of the validity problem for certain 
sublogics of DLre follows from the Lindstr6m construction and the Meyer- 
Parikh translation. 
Most sources directly construct a definition of (co, ~<), thus missing our 
result. One exception is Barwise (1974), who constructs a (,)-definition of 
finiteness along the way. But Barwise does not closely axiomatize this result, 
or draw any complexity conclusions from it. Another is Monk (1976), who 
only claims that validity is non-r.e, for logics satisfying his axioms, but 
whose proof contains the essentials of an argument for A°-hardness. 
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